Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38708 
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dc.contributor.authorNocke, Volkeren
dc.contributor.authorWhinston, Michael D.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-15-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-13T08:27:02Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-13T08:27:02Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38708-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger will affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, the characteristics of which may not yet be known to the antitrust authority. We show that, in many cases, this apparently difficult problem has a simple resolution: an antitrust authority can maximize discounted consumer surplus by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger today if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO) |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSIO Working Paper |x0099en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwKartellrechten
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsaufsichten
dc.subject.stwFusionen
dc.subject.stwKonsumentenrenteen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDynamic merger review-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn597597197en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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