Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38684 
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dc.contributor.authorHendricks, Kennethen
dc.contributor.authorPinkse, Jorisen
dc.contributor.authorPorter, Robert H.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-13T08:26:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-13T08:26:40Z-
dc.date.issued1999-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38684-
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO) |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSIO Working Paper |x0008en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleEmpirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn393597458en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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