Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38684
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dc.contributor.authorHendricks, Kennethen_US
dc.contributor.authorPinkse, Jorisen_US
dc.contributor.authorPorter, Robert H.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-13T08:26:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-13T08:26:40Z-
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38684-
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern Univ. |cEvanston, Ill.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSIO working paper |x0008en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleEmpirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctionsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn393597458en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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