Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38653 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CSIO Working Paper No. 0075
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO), Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
In the bilateral hold-up model and the moral hazard in teams model, introducing a third party allows implementation of the first-best outcome, even if the agents can renegotiate inefficient outcomes and collude. Fines paid to the third party provide incentives for truth-telling and first-best levels of investment. Our results suggest that models that provide foundations for hold-up and incomplete contracts by invoking renegotiation are sensitive to the introduction of third parties.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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