Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38653
Authors: 
Baliga, Sandeep
Sjöström, Tomas
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CSIO working paper 0075
Abstract: 
In the bilateral hold-up model and the moral hazard in teams model, introducing a third party allows implementation of the first-best outcome, even if the agents can renegotiate inefficient outcomes and collude. Fines paid to the third party provide incentives for truth-telling and first-best levels of investment. Our results suggest that models that provide foundations for hold-up and incomplete contracts by invoking renegotiation are sensitive to the introduction of third parties.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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