Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38651 
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dc.contributor.authorSpiegel, Yossien
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-13T08:26:13Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-13T08:26:13Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38651-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers three firms that engage in an R&D contest to develop a new profitable technology. For a broad range of parameters, the firm that leads the contest (i.e., has the highest probability of success) is better-off licensing or selling its superior interim knowledge to one of the two lagging firms or to both rather than holding on to its lead. Although transferring interim R&D knowledge to the lagging firms erodes the technological lead of the leading firm, it allows it to extract rents from its rivals and can possibly create value by increasing the chance that the licensee(s) will develop the new technology when the leading firm fails.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO) |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSIO Working Paper |x0088en
dc.subject.jelD45en
dc.subject.jelO32en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordInterim R&D knowledgeen
dc.subject.keywordexclusive and nonexclusive licensingen
dc.subject.keywordtransfer of knowledgeen
dc.subject.keywordcross-licensingen
dc.subject.stwInnovationswettbewerben
dc.subject.stwLizenzvergabeen
dc.subject.stwWissenstransferen
dc.titleLicensing interim R&D knowledge-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn57493765Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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