Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/3811 
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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen
dc.contributor.authorNunnenkamp, Peteren
dc.contributor.authorThiele, Raineren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:17:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:17:08Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/3811-
dc.description.abstractUsing panel data for 143 countries over the period 1973-2002, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data to account for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More specifically, our results suggest that general budget support and untied grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced to vote in line with the United States. When replicating the analysis for other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Paper |x1275en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordUN General Assemblyen
dc.subject.keywordVotingen
dc.subject.keywordBilateral Aiden
dc.subject.stwBilaterale Entwicklungshilfeen
dc.subject.stwAmerikanischen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Politiken
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleDoes US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn511206569en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1275en

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