Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37517
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Gerrits, Carsten | en |
dc.contributor.author | Beckmann, Klaus | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-11T09:03:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-11T09:03:47Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37517 | - |
dc.description.abstract | It is the prevailing approach in the public choice literature to model lobbying and corruption in the same manner. On the contrary, we attempt to capture both in the same framework (auction theory), but using different modelling approaches. We present a unified framework in which some interesting conclusions ensue, not the least the possibility of a benign view on corruption as in Besley (2006). | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M. | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Political Economy: Lobbying and Preferences |xE17-V2 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K42 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.title | Auctioning off a favour: corruption and lobbying in a combo model | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 65515910X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.