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dc.contributor.authorBartling, Björnen
dc.contributor.authorFehr, Ernsten
dc.contributor.authorSchmidt, Klausen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:10:38Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:10:38Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37503-
dc.description.abstractIn recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show experimentally that complementarities between high effort discretion, rent-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both employers and employees.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Organisational Design |xB15-V3en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.jelJ30en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordjob designen
dc.subject.keywordhigh-performance work systemsen
dc.subject.keywordscreeningen
dc.subject.keywordreputationen
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen
dc.subject.keywordtrusten
dc.subject.keywordcontrolen
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordcomplementaritiesen
dc.titleScreening, Competition, and Job Design-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn65481953Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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