Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37476
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dc.contributor.authorRoider, Andreasen_US
dc.contributor.authorEnglmaier, Florianen_US
dc.contributor.authorMühlheusser, Gerden_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T08:56:15Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T08:56:15Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37476-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate a moral hazard model with a one-sided commitment problem. That is, after effort provision, the agent is free to either stay with the principal or to leave and pursue his (ex-post) outside option, the value of which is increasing in effort. Depending on parameters, optimal contracts have interesting properties, such as first-best effort incentives, nonresponsiveness to underlying parameters, or inefficient separation. Moreover, the agent might suffer from a ceteris paribus improvement of his outside option. Potential applications of this framework include employment relationships and venture capital financing.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Asymmetric Information and Incentives |xA8-V1en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelK31en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordlimited commitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordex-post outside optionen_US
dc.subject.keywordlimited liabilityen_US
dc.titleOptimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leaveen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn655840753-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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