Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37466
Authors: 
Borck, Rainald
Wrohlich, Katharina
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Political Economy: Lobbying and Preferences E17-V3
Abstract: 
We analyse preferences for public, private or mixed provision of childcare theoretically and empirically. We model childcare as a publicly provided private good. Richer households should prefer private provision to either pure public or mixed provision. If public provision redistributes from rich to poor, the rich should favour mixed over pure public provision, but if public provision redistributes from poor to rich, the rich and poor might favour mixed provision while the middle class favour public provision ('ends against the middle'). Using estimates for household preferences from survey data, we find no support for the ends-against-the-middle result.
Subjects: 
childcare
redistribution
political preferences
public provision of private goods
JEL: 
D72
H42
J13
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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