Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37448 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Innovation No. C9-V2
Publisher: 
Verein für Socialpolitik, Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
This paper presents a theoretical model on firms' patenting decision in vertically differentiated markets. The model's prediction regarding patenting and rival's market entry decision are then tested empirically. We find that in industries which are characterized by easy-to-use knowledge spillovers the technological lead of the inventor is reduced to such an extent that the propensity to patent increases. Furthermore, the intensity of patent protection has a delaying impact on rival's market entry.
Subjects: 
patenting decision
secrecy
disclosure requirement
patent height
vertical product differentiation
JEL: 
O34
L13
C25
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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