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dc.contributor.authorHodler, Rolanden_US
dc.contributor.authorYektas, Hadien_US
dc.description.abstractWe study a model of war in which the outcome of the war is uncertain from the perspective of the involved countries not because of luck on the battlefield (as in standard models) but because of their lack of information about their opponents. In our model there are two countries characterized by their production and military technologies and their resources. While technologies are common knowledge, resources are private information. Each country decides how to allocate its resources to production and warfare. The country with the stronger military wins and receives aggregate production. In equilibrium the country with a comparative advantage in warfare allocates its entire resources to warfare for low resource levels and follows a non-decreasing concave strategy thereafter. In response to that, the other country allocates a constant fraction of its resources to warfare for relatively low resource levels and follows an increasing non-linear strategy thereafter. Unless its military technology is much weaker than the opponent's, the country with a comparative advantage in warfare chooses the stronger military at any resource level. From an ex ante perspective it is therefore likely to win the war.en_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Information and Contests |xD16-V2en_US
dc.subject.keywordall-pay auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordprivate informationen_US
dc.titleAll-pay waren_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US

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