Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37429
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dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen_US
dc.contributor.authorJeitschko, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:10:51Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:10:51Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37429-
dc.description.abstractWe contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With stochastic signals a unique equilibrium emerges that involves separation and has intuitive comparative-static properties as the degree of signaling depends on the prior type distribution. With deterministic signals both pooling and separating configurations occur. Laboratory data support the theory: In the stochastic variant, there is more signaling behavior than with deterministic signals, and less frequent types distort their signals relatively more. Moreover, the degree of congruence between equilibrium and subject behavior is greater in stochastic settings compared to deterministic treatments.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Game Theory and Applications |xB13-V3en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordnoiseen_US
dc.subject.keywordsignallingen_US
dc.subject.keywordlearningen_US
dc.subject.keywordstochastic environmentsen_US
dc.titleSignaling in Deterministic and Stochastic Settingsen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn654799458-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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