Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37424
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Betz, Regina | en |
dc.contributor.author | Calford, Evan M. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Heinzel, Christoph | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-11T08:53:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-11T08:53:05Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37424 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyse the efficiency effects of the initial permit allocation given to firms with market power in both permit and output market. We examine two models: a long-run model with endogenous technology and capacity choice, and a short-run model with fixed technology and capacity. In the long run, quantity pre-commitment with Bertrand competition can yield Cournot outcomes also under emissions trading. In the short run, Bertrand output competition reproduces the effects derived under Cournot competition, but displays higher pass-through profits. In a second-best setting of overallocation, a tighter emissions target tends to improve permit-market efficiency in the short run. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M. | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Regulating Related Industries |xE9-V3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q28 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D43 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | emissions trading | en |
dc.subject.keyword | initial permit allocation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Bertrand competition | en |
dc.subject.keyword | EU ETS | en |
dc.subject.keyword | endogenous technology choice | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Kreps and Scheinkman | en |
dc.title | Initial Allocation Effects in Permit Markets with Bertrand Output Oligopoly | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 655983341 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.