Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37403 
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dc.contributor.authorWestheide, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorGider, Jasminen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T08:53:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T08:53:36Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37403-
dc.description.abstractThis paper addresses the question of how the timing of corporate insider trading is related to the level of information asymmetry in a stock price. Our empirical analysis shows that, when buying their firm's shares, corporate insiders are likely to exploit their informational advantage through trading at times of high information asymmetry, while their selling appears more cautious because of reputational costs. Trading at times of high informational asymmetry pays off as abnormal returns increase in abnormal informational asymmetry. Further, we find that outside blockholdings, as a proxy for monitoring, can alleviate the exploitative behavior of insiders.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Trading, Information, and Market Microstructure |xG18-V3en
dc.subject.jelG34en
dc.subject.jelG14en
dc.subject.jelG18en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleIdiosyncratic Volatility and the Timing of Corporate Insider Trading-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn655932038en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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