Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37391
Authors: 
Brown, Alessio J. G.
Merkl, Christian
Snower, Dennis J.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Understanding the Dynamics of Labor Markets D1-V3
Abstract: 
This paper examines the labour market matching process by distinguishing its two component stages: the contact stage, in which job searchers make contact with employers and the selection stage, in which they decide whether to match. We construct a theoretical model explaining two-sided selection through microeconomic incentives. Firms face adjustment costs in responding to heterogeneous variations in the characteristics of workers and jobs. Matches and separations are described through firms' job offer and firing decisions and workers' job acceptance and quit decisions. Our calibrated model for the U.S. can account for important empirical regularities that the conventional matching model cannot.
Subjects: 
Matching
incentives
adjustment costs
unemployment
employment
quits
firing
job offers
job acceptance
JEL: 
E24
E32
J64
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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