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dc.contributor.authorWinkler, Ralphen
dc.contributor.authorQuaas, Martinen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:11:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:11:39Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37366-
dc.description.abstractEfficiency and sustainability often clash if limited-tenure use rights for renewable natural resources are rented to private resource managers. We introduce a mechanism reconciling these two issues for a stochastically developing natural resource. The mechanism selects the most patient and, thus, most sustainably harvesting resource manager in a second-price sealed-bid auction with minimum bids and it overcomes the incentive to mine the resource at the end of tenure by announcing a refund if a sustainability goal is obeyed. In addition, the mechanism ensures efficiency and is self-financing in expectation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Optimal Resource Extraction |xA15-V2en
dc.subject.jelQ20en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordauctioning-refunding-mechanismen
dc.subject.keywordefficiencyen
dc.subject.keywordrenewable resourceen
dc.subject.keywordstochastic modelen
dc.subject.keywordsustainabilityen
dc.titleMarkets for Sustainable Resource Use: Auctioned Limited-Tenure Use Rights with Refunding-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654681570en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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