Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37366
Authors: 
Winkler, Ralph
Quaas, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Optimal Resource Extraction A15-V2
Abstract: 
Efficiency and sustainability often clash if limited-tenure use rights for renewable natural resources are rented to private resource managers. We introduce a mechanism reconciling these two issues for a stochastically developing natural resource. The mechanism selects the most patient and, thus, most sustainably harvesting resource manager in a second-price sealed-bid auction with minimum bids and it overcomes the incentive to mine the resource at the end of tenure by announcing a refund if a sustainability goal is obeyed. In addition, the mechanism ensures efficiency and is self-financing in expectation.
Subjects: 
auctioning-refunding-mechanism
efficiency
renewable resource
stochastic model
sustainability
JEL: 
Q20
D44
D82
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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