Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37293
Authors: 
Gropp, Reint
Köhler, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Risk Taking and Productivity in International Banking E7-V1
Abstract: 
In this paper, we analyse whether bank owners or bank managers were the driving force behind the risks incurred in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We show that owner controlled banks had higher profits in the years before the crisis, and incurred larger losses and were more likely to require government assistance during the crisis compared to manager-controlled banks. The results are robust to controlling for a wide variety of bank specific, country specific, regulatory and legal variables. Regulation does not seem to mitigate risk taking by bank owners. We find no evidence that profit smoothing drives our findings. The results suggest that privately optimal contracts aligning the incentives of management and shareholders may not be socially optimal in banks.
Subjects: 
Banks
risk taking
corporate governance
ownership structure
financial crisis
JEL: 
G21
G30
G34
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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