Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37291
Authors: 
Werner, Peter
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Experimental Tests of Theories and Institutions D13-V1
Abstract: 
We conduct a microfinance experiment in which subjects are jointly responsible for credit repayments and decide repeatedly about the effort put into risky investment projects. Although average effort levels are generally high, we find that moral hazard problems still persist among borrowers. Moreover, the path dependency of effort decisions additionally mitigates the insurance effect of joint liability contracts. We compare two conversion mechanisms from joint to individual liability. First, an active selection of the group lending contract does not systematically increase cooperation relative to a reference treatment. Second, conversion based on repayment success tends to have a detrimental impact on effort levels of the remaining joint liability borrowers.
Subjects: 
Microfinance
group lending
individual lending
social preferences
JEL: 
O16
I38
C92
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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