Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37280 
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dc.contributor.authorGlöckner, Andreasen
dc.contributor.authorKube, Sebastianen
dc.contributor.authorNicklisch, Andreasen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:10:35Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:10:35Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37280-
dc.description.abstractLatent payback is a natural element of social interactions: Non-cooperators face substantial threats of not being supported in situations of dire need, or of being punished in seemingly unrelated situations. In the controlled environment of the laboratory, we experimentally explore the effects of latent sanctions on cooperation per se, as well as on the effectiveness of immediate sanctions. Our data indicate that latent sanctions alone are able to sustain cooperation in groups. However, the real power of latent sanctions is unleashed when combined with immediate sanctions. These situations enormously enhance cooperation within groups - and, do so moreover, with less intense sanctioning. This surprising result provides a potential explanation for the co-existence of latent and immediate sanctions in social interactions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Voluntary Cooperation |xE15-V2en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelK00en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDecentralized Punishmenten
dc.subject.keywordLatent Sanctionsen
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goodsen
dc.subject.keywordSanctioning Effectivenessen
dc.subject.keywordVoluntary Contribution Mechanismen
dc.subject.keywordLaboratory Experimenten
dc.titleThe benefits of latent payback in social dilemmas-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654820872en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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