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dc.contributor.authorGlöckner, Andreasen_US
dc.contributor.authorKube, Sebastianen_US
dc.contributor.authorNicklisch, Andreasen_US
dc.description.abstractLatent payback is a natural element of social interactions: Non-cooperators face substantial threats of not being supported in situations of dire need, or of being punished in seemingly unrelated situations. In the controlled environment of the laboratory, we experimentally explore the effects of latent sanctions on cooperation per se, as well as on the effectiveness of immediate sanctions. Our data indicate that latent sanctions alone are able to sustain cooperation in groups. However, the real power of latent sanctions is unleashed when combined with immediate sanctions. These situations enormously enhance cooperation within groups - and, do so moreover, with less intense sanctioning. This surprising result provides a potential explanation for the co-existence of latent and immediate sanctions in social interactions.en_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Voluntary Cooperation |xE15-V2en_US
dc.subject.keywordDecentralized Punishmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordLatent Sanctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordSanctioning Effectivenessen_US
dc.subject.keywordVoluntary Contribution Mechanismen_US
dc.subject.keywordLaboratory Experimenten_US
dc.titleThe benefits of latent payback in social dilemmasen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US

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