Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37278
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSchüwer, Ulrichen_US
dc.contributor.authorKosfeld, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:04:44Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:04:44Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37278-
dc.description.abstractPrevious research shows that firms may offer excessively high (and shrouded) add-on prices in competitive markets when some consumers are myopic. We analyze the effects of regulatory intervention via educating myopic consumers on equilibrium strategies of firms, consumer protection and welfare. Our model allows firms to price discriminate between consumers. We show that intervention may actually decrease social welfare and weaken consumer protection if regulatory efforts are insufficient to alter the equilibrium strategy of firms. In consequence, regulation may do more harm than good and hence should only be considered if the regulator can be sure to have a good understanding of pricing strategies in an industry.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Regulation and Pricing Policies |xF8-V2en_US
dc.subject.jelL50en_US
dc.subject.jelD40en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbounded rationalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation suppressionen_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial welfareen_US
dc.subject.keywordconsumer protectionen_US
dc.titleAdd-on Pricing, Consumer Myopia and Regulatory Interventionen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn654912726-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.