Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37278 
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dc.contributor.authorSchüwer, Ulrichen
dc.contributor.authorKosfeld, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:04:44Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:04:44Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37278-
dc.description.abstractPrevious research shows that firms may offer excessively high (and shrouded) add-on prices in competitive markets when some consumers are myopic. We analyze the effects of regulatory intervention via educating myopic consumers on equilibrium strategies of firms, consumer protection and welfare. Our model allows firms to price discriminate between consumers. We show that intervention may actually decrease social welfare and weaken consumer protection if regulatory efforts are insufficient to alter the equilibrium strategy of firms. In consequence, regulation may do more harm than good and hence should only be considered if the regulator can be sure to have a good understanding of pricing strategies in an industry.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Regulation and Pricing Policies |xF8-V2en
dc.subject.jelL50en
dc.subject.jelD40en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbounded rationalityen
dc.subject.keywordinformation suppressionen
dc.subject.keywordregulationen
dc.subject.keywordsocial welfareen
dc.subject.keywordconsumer protectionen
dc.titleAdd-on Pricing, Consumer Myopia and Regulatory Intervention-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654912726en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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