Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37267 
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dc.contributor.authorGiebe, Thomasen
dc.contributor.authorEnsthaler, Ludwigen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T08:56:29Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T08:56:29Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37267-
dc.description.abstractA budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We propose a procurement mechanism that can be viewed as a game-theoretic extension of the greedy-split heuristic for the classic knapsack problem. The mechanism exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies, is ex-post rational, and satisfies the hard budget constraint. Our mechanism obtains an optimal monotone pricing allocation if all items have the same quality. With different qualities, the equilibrium allocation is an optimal proportional pricing allocation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Optimal Monitoring and Mechanism Design |xB17-V2en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelD45en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAuctionsen
dc.subject.keywordMechanism Designen
dc.subject.keywordKnapsack Problemen
dc.subject.keywordDominant Strategyen
dc.subject.keywordBudgeten
dc.subject.keywordProcurementen
dc.titleA dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn655824413en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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