Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37267
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dc.contributor.authorGiebe, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.authorEnsthaler, Ludwigen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T08:56:29Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T08:56:29Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37267-
dc.description.abstractA budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We propose a procurement mechanism that can be viewed as a game-theoretic extension of the greedy-split heuristic for the classic knapsack problem. The mechanism exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies, is ex-post rational, and satisfies the hard budget constraint. Our mechanism obtains an optimal monotone pricing allocation if all items have the same quality. With different qualities, the equilibrium allocation is an optimal proportional pricing allocation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Optimal Monitoring and Mechanism Design |xB17-V2en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelD45en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAuctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordMechanism Designen_US
dc.subject.keywordKnapsack Problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordDominant Strategyen_US
dc.subject.keywordBudgeten_US
dc.subject.keywordProcurementen_US
dc.titleA dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constrainten_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn655824413-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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