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dc.contributor.authorBauernschuster, Stefanen
dc.contributor.authorFalck, Oliveren
dc.contributor.authorGroße, Niels Danielen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:10:44Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:10:44Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37262-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates how group membership and competition among trustors interact with trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory one-shot trust game. To analyze these effects, we apply a 2x2 design. We induce group membership by letting subjects play coordination games with clear focal points, leading to higher investments and trustworthiness. Introducing competition leads to a decrease in trustworthiness, especially among partners. We argue that once competition comes into play, trustees perceive trustors'investments as the outcomes of a competitive bidding process rather than good intentions, which reduces reciprocity.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Social Preferences |xE13-V3en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.jelZ13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtrusten
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordinvestment gameen
dc.subject.keywordgroup membershipen
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen
dc.titleCan Competition Spoil Reciprocity? - A Laboratory Experiment-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654809666en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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