Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37254
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dc.contributor.authorSchumacher, Heineren_US
dc.contributor.authorKesternich, Irisen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:09:50Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:09:50Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37254-
dc.description.abstractWe develop an insurance market model where consumers (i) exhibit present-biased preferences, and (ii) suffer from physical pain in case of (health-) damage. They can exert preventive effort to reduce the probability of damage. Sophisticated consumers correctly anticipate their effort and purchase full insurance. Naive consumers overestimate their future effort, purchase no insurance and end up with less effort than sophisticated ones. We allow consumers to differ in their wealth and risk preferences. Our model can explain why in some insurance markets there is a negative correlation between risk and insurance and a positive correlation between insurance and wealth.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Asymmetric Information and Risk |xC8-V1en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD91en_US
dc.subject.jelG22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordInsurance Markets, Moral Hazard, Hyperbolic Discounting, Sophisticationen_US
dc.titlePain, Precautions and Present-biased Preferences: A Theory of Health Insuranceen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn654844585-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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