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dc.contributor.authorChlaß, Nadineen_US
dc.description.abstractGames of imperfect information distribute information unevenly amongst parties. Recently, parties have been claimed to hold preferences purely over such procedural aspects. Here, I explore the impact purely procedural preferences exert if agents are without influence on the procedure itself. I design a game of imperfect information which exhibits extreme procedural asymmetry in that several procedural aspects advantage one and the same party over another. In an experimental test, parties are found to monetarily compensate the asymmetry such that almost no winner's curse results. I explain the compensation by an instrument for purely procedural preferences (Chlaß et al. 2009). The residual winner's curse links to personality traits. The game abstracts a management buy-in, the natural counterpart to a management buy-out.en_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Experimental Game Theory |xF13-V1en_US
dc.subject.keywordprocedural preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordwinner's curseen_US
dc.titleThe Impact of Procedural Asymmetry in Games of Imperfect Informationen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US

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