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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37221
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Prüfer, Jens | en |
dc.contributor.author | Zetland, David | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-11T08:56:11Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-11T08:56:11Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37221 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement of equilibrium. Besides the benefits of speed, this mechanmism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. In addition, the academic dollars for papers sold at auction go to the authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates academic impact - facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. We discuss practical issues and demonstrate that the auction market is implementable without relaxing editors' current pecuniary or time constraints. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M. | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Improving Productivity and Efficiency of Economic Science |xA2-V1 | en |
dc.subject.jel | A11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D02 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Academic Journals | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Academic Productivity | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Market Design | en |
dc.title | An Auction Market for Journal Articles | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 655848630 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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