Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37199
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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKovenock, Danen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:11:41Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:11:41Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37199-
dc.description.abstractWe study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (lifeboat seats). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes (lifeboats). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (a lifeboat). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen (a seat). We characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first stage. We find that the partitioning of prizes allows for coordination failure among players when they play nondegenerate mixed strategies and this can shelter rents and reduce rent dissipation compared to some of the less efficient pure strategy equilibria.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Auctions with Asymmetric Information |xA13-V3en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelD79en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordall-pay contesten_US
dc.subject.keywordmultiple prizesen_US
dc.subject.keywordrent dissipationen_US
dc.subject.keywordlifeboaten_US
dc.titleThe Lifeboat Problemen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn654650381-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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