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dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anjaen
dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T08:53:24Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T08:53:24Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37191-
dc.description.abstractWe identify a new problem that may arise when heterogeneous workers are motivated by relative performance schemes: If workers' abilities and the production technology are complements, the firm may prefer not to adopt a more advanced technology even though this technology would costlessly increase each worker's productivity. Due to the complementarity between ability and technology, under technology adoption the productivity of a more able worker increases more strongly than the productivity of a less able colleague, thereby reducing the motivation of both workers to exert effort under a relative incentive scheme. We show that this adverse incentive effect is dominant and, consequently, keeps the firm from introducing a better production technology if talent uncertainty is sufficiently high and/or monitoring of workers is sufficiently precise.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Principal Agent Problems |xG15-V3en
dc.subject.jelM55en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcomplementaritiesen
dc.subject.keywordheterogeneous workersen
dc.subject.keywordproduction technologyen
dc.subject.keywordtournamenten
dc.titleTechnology Choice and Incentives under Relative Performance Schemes-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn655941398en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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