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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37191
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Schöttner, Anja | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kräkel, Matthias | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-11T08:53:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-11T08:53:24Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37191 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We identify a new problem that may arise when heterogeneous workers are motivated by relative performance schemes: If workers' abilities and the production technology are complements, the firm may prefer not to adopt a more advanced technology even though this technology would costlessly increase each worker's productivity. Due to the complementarity between ability and technology, under technology adoption the productivity of a more able worker increases more strongly than the productivity of a less able colleague, thereby reducing the motivation of both workers to exert effort under a relative incentive scheme. We show that this adverse incentive effect is dominant and, consequently, keeps the firm from introducing a better production technology if talent uncertainty is sufficiently high and/or monitoring of workers is sufficiently precise. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M. | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Principal Agent Problems |xG15-V3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M55 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J33 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | complementarities | en |
dc.subject.keyword | heterogeneous workers | en |
dc.subject.keyword | production technology | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tournament | en |
dc.title | Technology Choice and Incentives under Relative Performance Schemes | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 655941398 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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