Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/3718
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dc.contributor.authorKlepper, Gernoten_US
dc.contributor.authorPeterson, Sonjaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:14:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:14:24Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.citation|aEnvironmental & resource economics |c0924-6460 |nSpringer |lDordrecht |v32 |y2005 |h2 |p205-227en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/3718-
dc.description.abstractAfter the conferences in Bonn and Marrakech it is likely that international emissions trading will be realized in the near future. Major influenceson the permit market are the institutional detail, the participation structureand the treatment of hot-air. Different scenarios do not only differ in their implications for the demand and supply of permits and thus the permit price, butalso in their allocative effects. In this paper we discuss likely institutional designs for permit allocation in the hot-air economies and the use of market power and quantify the resulting effects by using the computable general equilibrium model DART. It turns out that the amount of hot-air supplied will be small if hot-air economies cooperate in their decisions. Under welfare maximization more hot-air is supplied than in the case were governments try to maximize revenues from permit sales.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |cKiel, Hamburg-
dc.subject.jelQ48en_US
dc.subject.jelF18en_US
dc.subject.jelD58en_US
dc.subject.jelC68en_US
dc.subject.ddc330-
dc.subject.keywordCGE Modelen_US
dc.subject.keywordDARTen_US
dc.subject.keywordEmission Tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordHot-Airen_US
dc.subject.keywordKyoto Protocolen_US
dc.subject.keywordMarket Poweren_US
dc.subject.keywordPermit Allocationen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionsrechteen_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwAllgemeines Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.titleTrading hot-air: the influence of permit allocation rules, market power and the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocolen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkie:3718-
dc.identifier.printppn50135851Xen_US

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