Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/3718 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Environmental & resource economics [ISSN:] 0924-6460 [Volume:] 32 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Dordrecht [Year:] 2005 [Pages:] 205-227
Verlag: 
Springer, Dordrecht
Zusammenfassung: 
After the conferences in Bonn and Marrakech it is likely that international emissions trading will be realized in the near future. Major influences on the permit market are the institutional detail, the participation structure and the treatment of hot-air. Different scenarios do not only differ in their implications for the demand and supply of permits and thus the permit price, but also in their allocative effects. In this paper we discuss likely institutional designs for permit allocation in the hot-air economies and the use of market power and quantify the resulting effects by using the computable general equilibrium model DART. It turns out that the amount of hot-air supplied will be small if hot-air economies cooperate in their decisions. Under welfare maximization more hot-air is supplied than in the case were governments try to maximize revenues from permit sales.
Schlagwörter: 
CGE Model
DART
Emission Trading
Hot-Air
Kyoto Protocol
Market Power
Permit Allocation
JEL: 
Q48
F18
D58
C68
Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)

Datei(en):
Datei
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