Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/3718
Authors: 
Klepper, Gernot
Peterson, Sonja
Year of Publication: 
2005
Citation: 
[Journal:] Environmental & resource economics [ISSN:] 0924-6460 [Volume:] 32 [Year:] 2005 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 205-227
Abstract: 
After the conferences in Bonn and Marrakech it is likely that international emissions trading will be realized in the near future. Major influences on the permit market are the institutional detail, the participation structure and the treatment of hot-air. Different scenarios do not only differ in their implications for the demand and supply of permits and thus the permit price, but also in their allocative effects. In this paper we discuss likely institutional designs for permit allocation in the hot-air economies and the use of market power and quantify the resulting effects by using the computable general equilibrium model DART. It turns out that the amount of hot-air supplied will be small if hot-air economies cooperate in their decisions. Under welfare maximization more hot-air is supplied than in the case were governments try to maximize revenues from permit sales.
Subjects: 
CGE Model , DART , Emission Trading , Hot-Air , Kyoto Protocol , Market Power , Permit Allocation
JEL: 
Q48
F18
D58
C68
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.