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dc.contributor.authorvon Blanckenburg, Korbinianen
dc.contributor.authorGeist, Alexanderen
dc.contributor.authorKholodilin, Konstantin Arkadievichen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:03:59Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:03:59Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37171-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and non-collusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 8 out of 10 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Empirical Industrial Organization |xG9-V3en
dc.subject.jelL10en
dc.subject.jelL60en
dc.subject.jelL40en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcartel detectionen
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen
dc.subject.keywordcompetition policyen
dc.titleThe influence of collusion on price changes: New evidence from major cartel cases-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn655022996en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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