Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37171
Authors: 
von Blanckenburg, Korbinian
Geist, Alexander
Kholodilin, Konstantin Arkadievich
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Empirical Industrial Organization G9-V3
Abstract: 
In this paper, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and non-collusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 8 out of 10 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.
Subjects: 
cartel detection
collusion
competition policy
JEL: 
L10
L60
L40
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
179.92 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.