Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37024
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dc.contributor.authorRieck, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-29T10:08:15Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-29T10:08:15Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37024-
dc.description.abstractInmulti-attribute procurement auctions with multipleobjects, the auctioneer may care about the interplay of quality attributes that do not belong to the same item - like each item's delivery time, if all items are needed at once. This can influence theperformance of the auction mechanism. We generalize the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction to such an environment and show that the main properties still hold: Equilibria in profit-target strategies exist, the final allocation maximizes the surplus and the payoff vector is in the core. Furthermore, the scoring rule used to evaluate the bids may contain valuable information about the auctioneer for his competitors, providing an incentive not to reveal it.In our setting,it is possible to keep the scoring rule secret without changing the outcome of the auction. Additionally, for additive scoring rules a close connection to the original proxy auction exists.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aGraduate School of Economics |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2009,7en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMulti-object auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordmulti-attribute auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation revelationen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwBeschaffungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAscending combinatorial scoring auctionsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn603372384en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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