Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36897
Authors: 
Koskela, Erkki
König, Jan
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 4942
Abstract: 
We analyze the impact of international outsourcing on income, if the domestic labor market is imperfect. We distinguish in our analysis between the case where the parties negotiate over the wage only and where they negotiate over both wage and profit share. We find that in the first case outsourcing will reduce (increase) workers' income, if the labor union's bargaining power is sufficiently high (low) and outsourcing will increase workers' income in the second case. For the amount of optimal international outsourcing, we find that it is in a pure wage bargaining system positively (negatively) affected by a sufficiently high (low) labor union's bargaining power, while in a wage and profit share bargaining system, a higher union's bargaining power decreases the optimal amount of outsourcing.
Subjects: 
Strategic outsourcing
profit sharing
labor market imperfection
JEL: 
E23
E24
J23
J33
J82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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