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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/36857
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Altmann, Steffen | en |
dc.contributor.author | Falk, Armin | en |
dc.contributor.author | Huffman, David | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-06-22 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-23T09:34:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-23T09:34:04Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36857 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but not verifiable to a situation where explicit contracts are feasible. Our main result shows that unemployment is much higher when third-party contract enforcement is absent. Unemployment is involuntary, being caused by firms' employment and contracting policy. Moreover, we show that implicit contracting can lead to a segmentation of the labor market. Firms in both segments earn similar profits, but workers in the secondary sector face much less favorable conditions than their counterparts in primary-sector jobs. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x5001 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J64 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M55 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Incentives | en |
dc.subject.keyword | implicit contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | unemployment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | fairness | en |
dc.subject.keyword | dual labor markets | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Implizite Kontrakte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsanreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gerechtigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Dualer Arbeitsmarkt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsbedingungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Test | en |
dc.title | Implicit contracts, unemployment, and labor market segmentation | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 629762724 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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