Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36857
Authors: 
Altmann, Steffen
Falk, Armin
Huffman, David
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5001
Abstract: 
We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but not verifiable to a situation where explicit contracts are feasible. Our main result shows that unemployment is much higher when third-party contract enforcement is absent. Unemployment is involuntary, being caused by firms' employment and contracting policy. Moreover, we show that implicit contracting can lead to a segmentation of the labor market. Firms in both segments earn similar profits, but workers in the secondary sector face much less favorable conditions than their counterparts in primary-sector jobs.
Subjects: 
Incentives
implicit contracts
unemployment
fairness
dual labor markets
JEL: 
C92
J64
M55
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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