Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36830
Autoren: 
Berger, Johannes
Harbring, Christine
Sliwka, Dirk
Datum: 
2010
Reihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 5020
Zusammenfassung: 
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution system in which they had to assign differentiated grades. We find that productivity was significantly higher under a forced distribution by about 8%. But also in the absence of forced distribution, deliberate differentiation positively affected output in subsequent work periods.
Schlagwörter: 
Performance measurement
forced distribution
motivation
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D83
J33
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
212.63 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.