Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36830
Authors: 
Berger, Johannes
Harbring, Christine
Sliwka, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5020
Abstract: 
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution system in which they had to assign differentiated grades. We find that productivity was significantly higher under a forced distribution by about 8%. But also in the absence of forced distribution, deliberate differentiation positively affected output in subsequent work periods.
Subjects: 
Performance measurement
forced distribution
motivation
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D83
J33
M52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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