Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/36730 
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dc.contributor.authorHeitzler, Svenen
dc.contributor.authorWey, Christianen
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-02-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-22T09:28:53Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-22T09:28:53Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36730-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the bargaining problem of an incumbent firm and a union when the wage contract becomes generally binding. Our main application relates to competition among operators of mail delivery networks. We describe the Deutsche Post case which highlights the raising rivals' costs incentive and its consequences resulting from labor laws that make collective agreements generally binding. We show that minimum wages implemented by means of extension regulation are an effective deterrence instrument which frustrates both market entry as well as investments into the build-up of a mail delivery network.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x1008en
dc.subject.jelL12en
dc.subject.jelJ52en
dc.subject.jelK31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMinimum wagesen
dc.subject.keywordpostal servicesen
dc.subject.keywordcollective bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordraising rivals' costsen
dc.subject.stwPostbeförderungen
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten
dc.subject.stwArbeitskostenen
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwMindestlohnen
dc.subject.stwTarifpolitiken
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleRaising rivals' fixed (labor) costs: The Deutsche Post case-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn627235417en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1008en

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