Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/36730
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Heitzler, Sven | en |
dc.contributor.author | Wey, Christian | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-06-02 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-22T09:28:53Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-22T09:28:53Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36730 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze the bargaining problem of an incumbent firm and a union when the wage contract becomes generally binding. Our main application relates to competition among operators of mail delivery networks. We describe the Deutsche Post case which highlights the raising rivals' costs incentive and its consequences resulting from labor laws that make collective agreements generally binding. We show that minimum wages implemented by means of extension regulation are an effective deterrence instrument which frustrates both market entry as well as investments into the build-up of a mail delivery network. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDIW Discussion Papers |x1008 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L12 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J52 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K31 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Minimum wages | en |
dc.subject.keyword | postal services | en |
dc.subject.keyword | collective bargaining | en |
dc.subject.keyword | raising rivals' costs | en |
dc.subject.stw | Postbeförderung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Markteintritt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitskosten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnverhandlungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Mindestlohn | en |
dc.subject.stw | Tarifpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Deutschland | en |
dc.title | Raising rivals' fixed (labor) costs: The Deutsche Post case | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 627235417 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1008 | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.