Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36482
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dc.contributor.authorBieta, Volkeren_US
dc.contributor.authorBroll, Udoen_US
dc.contributor.authorSiebe, Wilfrieden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-15T09:39:23Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-15T09:39:23Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36482-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is described by a continuous density of outcomes. Different density functions are classified according to second stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we find that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. of Technology, Fac. of Business Management and Economics |cDresdenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDresden discussion paper series in economics |x04/08en_US
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.jelG20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSignalingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollateralen_US
dc.subject.keywordperfect Bayesian equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwKreditgeschäften_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwBayes-Statistiken_US
dc.titleThe banking firm: the role of signaling with collateralsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn590241001en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuddps:0408-

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