Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36480
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dc.contributor.authorLessmann, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorMarkwardt, Guntheren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-01en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-15T09:39:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-15T09:39:22Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36480-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines whether the federal structure of aid-receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness. Following the decentralization theorem, the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness, since local decision-makers are better informed about local needs. At the same time, decentralization has reverse effects, e.g., through coordination problems, excessive regulation, administrative costs and local capture. Using panel data for up to 59 countries, we find that aid is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries. Our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how both anti-poverty instruments financial assistance and decentralization work together.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. of Technology, Fac. of Business Management and Economics |cDresdenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDresden discussion paper series in economics |x09/09en_US
dc.subject.jelO1en_US
dc.subject.jelO2en_US
dc.subject.jelO4en_US
dc.subject.jelH7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordForeign Aiden_US
dc.subject.keywordGrowthen_US
dc.subject.keywordDecentralizationen_US
dc.titleAid, growth and decentralizationen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn603457878en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuddps:0909-

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