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dc.contributor.authorLessmann, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorMarkwardt, Guntheren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-15T09:39:17Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-15T09:39:17Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36476-
dc.description.abstractThe majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially depends on the possibility to monitor bureaucrat's behavior. The benefits of interjurisdictional competition only occur if there is a supervisory body such as a free press, which is often lacking in less-developed countries. Using crosscountry data, we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking different degrees of the freedom of the press into account. Our main finding is that decentralization counteracts corruption in countries with high degrees of press freedom, whereas countries with low monitoring possibilities suffer from decentralization. Our policy implication is, therefore, that a free press is a necessary pre-condition for successful decentralization programs.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aTechnische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften |cDresdenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x14/08en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelH72en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddecentralizationen
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordfreedom of pressen
dc.subject.stwGewaltenteilungen
dc.subject.stwDezentralisierungen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwMeinungsfreiheiten
dc.subject.stwBürokratieen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleOne size fits all? Decentralization, corruption, and the monitoring of bureaucrats-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn590262629en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuddps:1408en

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