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dc.contributor.authorCigno, Alessandroen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-04-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:07:34Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:07:34Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36267-
dc.description.abstractWe use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the choice of game conditional on marriage. We find that, in the absence of social stigma or legal discrimination against unmarried couples, a couple will marry only if marriage serves as a commitment device which facilitates cooperation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4635en
dc.subject.jelD13en
dc.subject.jelJ12en
dc.subject.jelJ13en
dc.subject.jelJ16en
dc.subject.jelJ24en
dc.subject.jelK30en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordGenderen
dc.subject.keywordcohabitationen
dc.subject.keywordmarriageen
dc.subject.keyworddivorceen
dc.subject.keywordalimonyen
dc.subject.keywordmatrimonial propertyen
dc.subject.keywordfertilityen
dc.subject.keyworddivision of labouren
dc.subject.stwEheen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwKosten-Nutzen-Analyseen
dc.subject.stwEherechten
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechten
dc.subject.stwGeschlechten
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWhat's the use of marriage?-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn617852146en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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