Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorDur, Roberten
dc.contributor.authorNon, Arjanen
dc.contributor.authorRoelfsema, Heinen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-16-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:05:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:05:36Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039-
dc.description.abstractWe study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4782en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.jelM51en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelM54en
dc.subject.jelM55en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordReciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordsocial exchangeen
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen
dc.subject.keyworddouble moral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordGSOEPen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwVerantwortungen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleReciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn621169404en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
229.92 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.