Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35980
Authors: 
Chiappori, Pierre-André
Donni, Olivier
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 4603
Abstract: 
This article considers non-unitary models of household behavior. These models suppose explicitly that households consist of a number of different members with preferences that are different from each other. They can be split up into two principal categories: cooperative (or collective) models, in which the allocations are supposed to be Pareto efficient; and non-cooperative (or strategic) models which are based on the concept of Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The demand functions that describe household behavior in these models are subject to constraints that differ from the traditional Slutsky conditions. In addition, in a certain number of specific cases, the preferences of the different household members can be identified from observable behavior.
Subjects: 
Households
collective model
strategic model
testability
identification
JEL: 
D11
D13
J22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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