Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35940
Authors: 
Dreher, Axel
Klasen, Stephan
Vreeland, James Raymond
Werker, Eric
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 4820
Abstract: 
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.
Subjects: 
World Bank
aid effectiveness
political influence
United Nations Security Council
JEL: 
O19
O11
F35
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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